Abstract: In this paper, we consider the decision-making and coordination mechanism of a seasonal product supply chain channel with a low season and a high season, where the price of the final product is strictly regulated, and the raw material is subject to price cap regulation in the high season. The optimal decision-making and profit under decentralized and centralized cases are derived for the low season and the high season. Our research indicates that, under the double price regulation, the manufacturer's raw material order usually will not be completely fulfilled in the high season and the ordering quantity in the channel is usually small in the low season. Based on the results, we propose a mutual incentive mechanism, in order to encourage the supplier to supply more raw material during the high season and the manufacturer to order more raw material during the low season. Both the theoretical results and the numerical example show that the mutual incentive mechanism can effectively coordinate seasonal product supply chain channel under double price regulation. Moreover, the negotiation skills of the supplier and the manufacturer are also considered under the mutual incentive mechanism, so that the spillover profit can be allocated on a win-win basis for both sides.
Figure 1: Supply chain channel of seasonal products
In this paper, we consider a supply chain with double price regulation for a seasonal product with a low season and a high season. The supply chain channel of seasonal products is shown in Fig. 1 . The supplier sells the raw material through the channel with regulated price and outside of the channel with the market price. The raw material price in the channel are regulated and it is usually lower than the market price in the high season. There is usually some penalty to the supplier if the demand from the manufacturer is not completely fulfilled. The manufacturer mainly purchases raw materials through the channel. When a supply shortage happens in the channel, the manufacturer purchases the raw material from outside of the channel. As the price of the final product produced by the manufacturer is strictly regulated, the raw materials in the channel are subject to the price cap regulation in the high season. When the manufacturer purchases the raw material from outside of the channel, the manufacturer needs to pay the searching cost and the market price for the raw material. The market price of the raw material is usually higher than the price in the channel in the high season.
We first consider the decentralized case, under which both the manufacturer and the supplier choose their decision variables only to maximized their own (expected) profit s. The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game model, where the manufacturer is the leader and the supplier is the follower. Then we derive the solutions for the supplier's optimal production and supply level, and the manufacturer's optimal ordering quantities in the high season and the low season. Meanwhile the impacts of double price regulation on the supply chain's decision-making and profit are investigated and discussed.
Next we consider the centralized case, under which the decisions are made to maximize the total expected profit of the supply chain. Not surprisingly, under the centralized case, the supplier always fulfills the demand of the manufacturer during the high season, while the manufacturer will order more raw material during the low season. The centralized case is an ideal case and it may not be realistic, as the optimal solutions may not bring higher profits for both the supplier and the manufacturer at the same time. In other words, the total profit is maximized does not mean that the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of the supplier are maximized at the same time.
We then propose a mutual incentive mechanism, under which the manufacturer will subside the supplier to encourage the supplier to supply more raw material during the high season, while the supplier will subside the manufacturer to encourage the manufacturer to order more raw material during the low season. The subside ratios can be chosen such that the total profit of the supply chain is maximized, that is, the total profit will be consistent with the centralized case. At the same time, the supplier and the manufacturer can negotiate with each other about the base ordering quantity for subsiding purpose, so that a desired win-win spillover profit allocation can be achieved. An interesting finding is that under the mutual incentive mechanism, even the profit of the supply chain is maximized, the probability of the final product shortage will increase. Therefore, the double price regulation may not be a perfect approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Literature review is given in Section 2. Then the problem set up and formulation are given in Section 3. In Section 4, we consider the decentralized model, and in Section 5, we consider the centralized model. The mutual incentive mechanism will be proposed and studied in Section 6. A numerical example is given in Section 7 and we conclude the paper with Section 8.
Literature review
Price regulations in supply chains have been considered by many researchers. Arocena et al (2002) , Matsukawa (2008) , Jiao et al (2010) and Johnsen and Olsen (2011) investigated the impact of price regulation on energy products such as electricity. Ciarreta and Espinosa (2012) considered the impacts of price regulation in the Spanish electricity market. Coco and Vincenti (2004) considered the possibility that the price regulation increases a monopolist's cost-efficiency. Galbi (2001) showed how empirical evidence concerning customer acquisition costs, customer switching costs, and churn among service providers may be used for regulating price adjustment. Dumitru and Jianu (2009) showed that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is expected to result in higher inflation in Romania. Wang (2013) proposed a grey linear control system for regulating the price of China's real estate. Weisman (2002 Weisman ( , 2005 , Breton and Kharbach (2012) , Guthrie (2012) and Evans and Guthrie (2012) studied the incentives of regulated firms' investment and strategic behavior. Although there have been many researchers who considered the price regulation in supply chains, most of them only pay attention to single price regulation. On the other hand, there are not so many literatures that considered the coordination mechanism under the price regulation. The literature include Sappington and Weisman (1996) , Iossa and Stroffolini (2005) and Weisman (2005) and they considered the revenue (profit ) sharing coordination under price cap regulation. In this paper, we will consider a coordination mechanism for a supply chain model under double price regulations.
We also consider the seasonal demand effect in this paper. In terms of the decision-making problem of the supply chain with seasonal demand, most of the researchers considered the optimal production, inventory or order lot-size with fluctuating demand ( see, e.g. Hsieh and Dye, 2013; Kogan and Herbon, 2008; Chern et al, 2008; Moon et al, 2005; Yang et al, 2001; Skouri and Papachristos, 2002; Yang et al, 2011; Hsieh, 2011, 2013; Chen et al, 2002 and Banerjee and Sharma, 2010) . Some researchers considered the optimal replenishment policy for product with seasonal demand (see, e.g., You, 2005; Panda et al, 2008 and . Hsu and Li (2011) focused on supply chain network design problems by considering economies of scale and demand fluctuations.
Some researchers considered the coordination mechanism of the supply chain with seasonal demand. Chang and Chou (2013) considered a single product coordination system using a periodic review policy. Dye and Ouyang (2011) established a deterministic economic order quantity model for a retailer to determine its optimal selling price, replenishment quantity and replenishment schedule with fluctuating demand under two levels of trade credit policy. Cho and Lee (2013) used three levels of information sharing to coordinate the supply chain in order to evaluate the value of information sharing in a two echelon seasonal supply chain. Wu and Zhang (2007) considered simulation of interaction between customers and suppliers in a three-channel supply chain system and they found that in the simulation, customers respond to the price discount offer made by the supplier and the supplier makes adjustment of the price according to the inventory level. Chen and Xu (2001) introduced an improved operating system whose impacts on both bodies of a supply chain are examined under the condition of information symmetry.
For supply chains with seasonal demand, some researchers considered the multi-period decision-making and coordination problems. Chen and Xiao (2011) developed a two-period game model of a manufacturer-retailer supply chain and then derived the optimal decisions. Liu et al (2012) examined the use of price-commitment policies in dynamic contracting in multipleperiod, finite-time horizons. Aviv and Federgruen (2001) addressed multi-item inventory systems with random, seasonal fluctuating, and possibly correlated demands. Some researchers considered demand models in the dynamic pricing setting, where historical prices affect the current demand (see, e.g., Kopalle et al, 1996; Fibich et al, 2003; Popescu and Wu, 2007) . Bersanko and Winston (1990) considered a markdown pricing mechanism of a monopolist facing a fixed number of customers. Conlisk et al (1984) , Sobel (1991) and Ahn et al (2007) considered some joint manufacturing-pricing decision problems, accounting for demand that is induced by the interaction of pricing decisions in the current period and in previous periods. In terms of the research on competition and coordination of multi-channel supply chains, dual-channel supply chain is mostly studied (Boyaei, 2005; Chiang et al, 2003; Chiang and Monahan, 2005; Chiang, 2010; Tsay and Agrawal, 2004; Yao et al, 2009; Seifert et al, 2006; Geng and Mallik, 2007) .
For the decision-making and coordination problem of the supply chain with seasonal demand, not so many literatures considered the price regulation. To our best knowledge, only Breton and Kharbach (2012) considered the effects of price regulation. They established a multi-period game model under three scenarios: no regulation, a dynamic setting where the price cap adjustment mechanism is not adopted by the players, and a dynamic setting where it is adopted by the players. Peng et al (2013) studied the peak shaving reserve mechanism of coal-electricity supply chain under double price regulations. However, the aim of peak shaving reserve mechanism is not to achieve the chain's total profit maximization or a win-win situation for all enterprises in the chain, but to ease the contradiction in coal electricity supply. Moreover, the construction of peak shaving reserve warehouses of thermal coal is always beyond the enterprises' ability.
In this paper, we consider a seasonal products supply chain channel under double price regulation. In particular, we consider a cycle with a low season and a high season. The chain's decision-making on production, order and sales under the double price regulation is investigated in the high season and the low season. Meanwhile, the impacts of double price regulation on the chain's decision-making and profit are also investigated. Based on the results, we propose a mutual incentive coordination mechanism, in order to achieve the chain's total profit maximization and a win-win situation for all enterprises in the chain.
The main contributions in this paper are as follows. First, we propose a mutual incentive coordination mechanism, in order to encourage the supplier to supply more raw material during the high season and to encourage the manufacturer to order more raw material during the low season. Secondly, our theoretical results and numerical analysis indicate that under the mutual incentive mechanism, the profit level under centralized decision-making of the seasonal products supply chain channel with the double price regulation can be achieved. Thirdly, we consider the negotiation skills of the supplier and the manufacturer, so that the profits under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism can be allocated on a win-win basis. Finally, we prove that although the chain's total profit maximization and a win-win situation can be achieved for all enterprises under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism, the shortage probability of the final product supply in the high season may increase.
Problem statement and assumptions
We consider a seasonal supply chain channel with one supplier and one manufacturer. Seasonal fluctuations exist in the market demand for the raw material and the final product in the supply chain. We use subscripts h, l to indicate the high season and the low season, respectively. Subscript s indicates the supplier, and subscript m indicates the manufacturer.
The manufacturer faces the uncertainty in the market demand for the final product. We assume that the demands for the final product during the high season and the low season are random variables denoted by X h and X l respectively. Further, we denote their probability density functions as f h (x), f l (x), their distribution functions as F h (x), F l (x), and their survive functions asF h (x),F l (x), respectively. We assume that both X h and X l are positive continuous type random variables. Therefore,
As the final product is subject to price regulation, we assume that its price P m is the same in the high season as in the low season. Further, we assume that there are some price regulations for the raw material, too. In the low season, we assume that the price of the raw material in the supply chain channel and outside of the channel are both P s,l . In the high season, while the price of the raw material in other channels are P s,h , the price in the channel is subject to the price cap regulation and the floating rate of price is no more than λ, so the price in the channel would be (1 + λ)P s,l . Typically, in the high season, the regulated price (1 + λ)P s,l in the channel is less than the market price P s,h outside of the channel, that is, (1 + λ)P s,l < P s,h .
For simplicity, we assume that one unit of the final product needs one unit of the raw material and the manufacturer's production cost is C m (in addition to the raw material cost). Due to the uncertainty of the market demand of the final product, the manufacturer may face the final product shortage (when the produced quantity is less than the market demand) or some surplus (when the produced quantity is more than the market demand). Assume that the shortage cost and holding cost of the unsold final product are R m and H m per unit, respectively. The manufacturer's ordering quantity of the raw material in the high season and the low season are q m,h and q m,l respectively, and q m,h , q m,l are the decision variables for the manufacturer.
Assume that the production cost of the raw material is C s and the supplier's raw material production capacity during the high season and the low season are Q s,h and Q s,l , respectively. In the high season, due to the high demand of the raw material, we assume that the supplier arranges its production according to its production capacity. In the low season, due to the weak demand of the raw material, the supplier may choose a production level q s,l that is not higher than the full production capacity (q s,l ≤ Q s,l ). q s,l is one of the supplier's decision variables.
The other decision variable of the supplier is q 1,h , the quantity of the raw material to be supplied to the manufacturer in the channel in the high season. Since the price of the raw material is regulated and it is lower than the market price outside of the channel, the supplier will sell all material out of the channel if there is no penalty. We assume that if the raw material supply in the channel is lower than the ordering quantity (q 1,h < q m,h ), the supplier will suffer a shortage cost of credibility loss or punishment by the regulator, which is denoted by C r . In addition, we assume that the shortage cost in the channel, C r is an increasing function of the shortage quantity q ≡ q m,h − q 1,h with increasing margin, that is dCr dq ≥ 0 and d 2 Cr dq 2 ≥ 0. In this paper, we assume that
where R s > 0 is the shortage cost coefficient for the supplier. This assumption is more reasonable for this supply chain model than the assumption of fixed unit shortage cost (without losing generality, denoted the fixed shortage cost as R s ). The reason is as the follows. When the unit shortage cost is fixed as R s , the total shortage cost is R s (q m,h − q 1,h ) + and the optimal supply level of q 1,h in decentralized system is
It is a trivial bang-bang solution. In reality, due to price regulations, in the high season the supply quantity of the raw material in the channel would not simply equal to q m,h or 0 and it is typically lower than q m,h and higher than 0. Therefore, a linear shortage cost function R s (q m,h − q 1,h ) + is not very realistic.
In the high season, if the raw material supplied in the channel is lower than the ordering quantity, the manufacturer purchases the remaining raw materials from outside of the channel, and the purchasing quantity is q = q m,h − q 1,h . Not only the manufacturer needs to pay a higher price P s,h , but also the manufacturer needs to pay the searching cost. We assume that the searching cost, C k is an increasing function of the purchasing quantity q with increasing margin, that is dC k dq ≥ 0 and
In this paper, we assume that
where k m > 0 is the searching cost coefficient. In the low season, the price of the raw material in the channel or outside the channel are all P s,l . The supplier may choose to supply more raw material than needed in the channel and then sell the surplus outside of the channel. We assume that the supplier's marketing cost outside of the channel, C p is an increasing function of the surplus quantity of raw materialsq ≡ q s,l − q m,l with increasing margin, that is dCp dq ≥ 0 and d 2 Cp dq 2 ≥ 0. In this paper, we assume that
where k s is the marketing cost coefficient.
Remark 1 Typically, in the high season, the supplier tends to supply less raw material in the channel due to the higher price outside of the channel. So we can get that q 1,h ≤ q m,h . On the other hand, in the low season, due to the weak market, the manufacturer's order quantity in the channel is usually less than or equal to the supplier's production quantity of raw material, that is q m,l ≤ q s,l . For the above reasons, we can replace (1), (3) and (4) by
We study a cycle contains a low season and a high season and we assume that the first season is the low season, so the manufacturer can store more raw material in the low season for the following the high season. A cycle starting with a high season and end with a low season would not make much sense, as there is no inventory can be used for the high season and no need to hold the surplus for the low season (this is the end of the cycle). Therefore, if we start with the high season, we can treat the high season as a single starting cycle with a high season only and then start a new cycle with the low season followed by a high season. Our approach can be used to find the solutions for the starting cycle with the high season only.
Decentralized decision-making model under double price regulation
We first consider the case of decentralized decision making model where both the supplier and the manufacturer make decisions to maximize their own (expected) profit s. In particular, the manufacturer will choose ordering quantities q m,l (for the low season) and q m,h (for the high season), and the supplier will choose the quantity q 1,h (to be supplied in the channel in the high season) and q s,l (the production level in the low season). We further assume that the manufacturer knows the optimal strategies of the supplier when the manufacturer makes decisions. On the other hand, the supplier makes decisions on the production and supply in both the high season and the low season, according to the raw material ordering quantity in the channel. Superscript D indicates decision-making under the decentralized case. Under the condition of decentralized decision-making, the supplier and the manufacturer are in a Stackelberg game. In this game, the manufacturer is the leader while the supplier is the follower. The Stackelberg game model can be solved by using the backward induction.
Supplier's production and supply decisions
According to the backward induction, the supplier chooses the optimal production and supply quantities based on the manufacturer's ordering quantity of the raw material. We assume that q 1,h ≤ q m,h and q m,l ≤ q s,l (see Remark 1). Then the supplier's profit in one cycle with a low season followed by a high season is:
Among them, the first item is the sales income through the channel in the high season. The second item is the sales income from outside of the channel in the high season. The third item is the sales income in the low season. The fourth item is the supplier's production cost. The fifth item is the marketing cost outside of the channel in the low season. The sixth item is the shortage cost of the channel in the high season.
Proposition 1 Under the decentralized case, the supplier's optimal decisions on supply quantity in the channel in the high season and production quantity in the low season are:
Proof. From the definition of π D s , we can get
and
So the Hessian matrix is negative definite. Therefore, π D s is a concave function of q 1,h , q s,l . Set
and noting that the supplier's raw material production capacity during the low season is Q s,l , we can get (9). Q. E. D.
From Proposition 1, we can see that under the decentralized case, in the high season, because the price of the raw material in the channel is lower than the price outside of the channel, i.e., (1 + λ)P s,l < P s,h , the supplier tends to sell the raw material outside of the channel to get a higher price. Therefore, in the high season, the supplier's raw material supply quantity in the channel is lower than the manufacturer's ordering quantity, and the shortage difference increases with the price difference. Proposition 1 also shows that in the low season, the supplier's sales quantity outside of the channel increases with marginal revenue and decreases with marketing cost coefficient.
Further, from Proposition 1 , we can get that in the low season, when the ordering quantity of the manufacturer q D m,l satisfies Q s,l − P s,l −Cs 2ks ≤ q D m,l ≤ Q s,l , the supplier's production quantity of the raw material will equal to the productive capacity Q s,l and some of the raw material will be sold outside of the channel after the order from the manufacturer has been fulfilled. If q m,l < Q s,l − P s,l −Cs 2ks , then the supplier will produce q m,l + P s,l −Cs 2ks , some of which will be sold outside of the channel. Finally, if q m,l > Q s,l , the supplier will use the full production capacity and all the raw material will go to the manufacturer.
Manufacturer's purchasing decision
Now we consider the manufacturer's decision model under the decentralized case. Under this case, the manufacturer's profit in one cycle is:
Among them, the first item is the sales income of the final products in both the high season and the low season, including the products that were not sold in the low season but were then sold in the high season. The second item is the production cost of the final products. The third item is the shortage cost of the final products. The fourth item is the holding cost of unsold final products. The fifth item is the purchasing cost of the channel in the high season. The sixth item is the purchasing cost outside of the channel in the high season. The seventh item is the purchasing cost in the low season. The eighth item is the searching cost outside of the channel in the high season. We assume that the manufacturer is rational and knows the supplier's decisions on production and supply, i.e., equation (9). Based on the assumption that the supplier will choose the optimal strategy given by (9), the manufacturer will choose the optimal ordering quantities q m,l , q m,h during the low season and the high season, respectively, to maximized the expected profit E[π D m ]. The manufacturer's decision model is as follows:
In the above setup, D l and D h are expected values of the demand variable X l and X h , respectively, that is,
Proposition 2 Under the decentralized case, the manufacturer's optimal decisions on the ordering quantity of the raw material in the low and high seasons are the solution of the following equations:
Proof. Pluging (9) to E[π D m ], we can get
So we have
, and the Hessian matrix is negative
= 0, then we can get the first equation of (11). Pluging it to
From Proposition 2, we can see that when the holding cost of unsold products is lower than the difference between the regulated raw material prices in the low season and high season, the manufacturer will order the raw material as much as possible in the low season to store for the following the high season. This is not surprising, because in this case, ordering more raw materials can bring more profit for the manufacturer.
Together with Proposition 1, we can see that, under the decentralized case, if the holding cost is lower than than price difference between the high season and the low season in the channel (H m ≤ λP s,l ), the manufacturer's order quantity will equal to the supplier's production capacity in the lower season. If the holding cost is high (H m > λP s,l ), that may not be the case and the supplier may need to sell some raw materials outside of the channel. See the numerical example in Section 7.
Centralized decision-making model under double price regulation
Now we consider the centralized case. Under the centralized case, the supplier and the manufacturer both belong to an economic entity, and make decisions aiming to maximize the total profit of the whole supply chain. The centralized case is an ideal situation. Under this case, the total profit of the whole supply chain (the manufacturer and the supplier) is
Proposition 3 Under the centralized case, the optimal decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer are:
Proof. It is easy to get that
So we can derive that q C 1,h = q m,h . Further, we have
and plug it into
and we can get
= 0, and we can get (12).
Q. E. D.
From Proposition 3, we can see that when the holding cost of unsold products is lower than the difference between the prices of the raw material outside of the channel in the high season and the production cost of the raw material (H m ≤ P s,h − C s ), the manufacturer will order the raw material as much as possible in the low season to store for the following high season. This is because in this case, ordering more raw materials can realize more profit for the supply chain channel.
Mutual incentive mechanism under double price regulation
According to equation (9), due to the price regulation and the impact of seasonal fluctuation of the final product demand, the manufacturer faces supply shortage in the channel during the high season, and needs to purchase raw materials outside of the channel by paying 'higher price' and extra searching cost. On the other hand, in the low season, the supplier faces insufficient ordering in the channel, and needs to promote raw materials outside of the channel and pay marketing cost.
Here we propose a mutual incentive mechanism aiming to lower the overall cost for the manufacturer as well as for the supplier. The research objectives on this mutual incentive coordination are illustrated in two aspects: one is to achieve the total profit maximization of the supply chain and the other is to reach a win-win situation for the supplier and the manufacturer.
In particular, we propose the mutual incentive mechanism as follows.
• During the high season, in addition to the price paid to the supplier for the raw material, the manufacturer subsides the supplier to supply more raw material above a certain level q 0,h . The unit subside amount is I h for any raw material provided in excess of q 0,h . So the total incentive to the supplier is I h (q 1,h − q 0,h ) + . Among them, I h , q 0,h are coordination coefficients to be determined by the manufacturer. Typically, the manufacturer will choose q 0,h such that q 0,h ≤ q 1,h , so the total incentive to the supplier is I h (q 1,h − q 0,h ). We will discuss the choice of q 0,h later in Subsection 6.2.
• During the low season, the supplier provides incentives to the manufacturer to order more raw material by subsiding the manufacturer the amount of I l per unit of the raw material that is in excess of the predetermined level q 0,l . The total cost that the supplier subsides the manufacturer is I l (q m,l − q 0,l ) + . Among them, I l , q 0,l are coordination coefficients to be chosen by the supplier. Typically, the supplier will choose q 0,l such that q 0,l ≤ q m,l , so the total incentive to the manufacturer is I l (q m,l − q 0,l ). More discussion about the choice of q 0,l can be found in Subsection 6.2.
Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the coordination coefficients I h , q 0,h , I l , q 0,l should be chosen to achieve the total profit maximization of the chain, and to guarantee a win-win situation for members in the supply chain. We will first derive the solutions under the mutual incentive mechanism, and then we will discuss how to choose the coordination coefficients in Subsection 6.2.
Decision-making model under mutual incentive mechanism
Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the supplier's profit is:
Proposition 4 Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the supplier's optimal decisions on supply quantity in the channel in the high season and the raw material production quantity in the low season are:
The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 1, so we omit it here. From Proposition 4, we can see that the higher I h is, the more raw material the supplier sells to the manufacturer in the high season. So the mutual incentive mechanism can encourage the supplier to supply more raw material in the high season.
Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the manufacturer's expected profit is:
Proposition 5 Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the manufacturer's optimal decisions on the ordering quantity of raw materials during the high season and the low season are the solutions of the following equations:
The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 2, so we omit it here. From Proposition 5, we can see that when q m,h and I h are given, the higher I l is, the more raw material the manufacturer orders in the low season. So the mutual incentive mechanism can give incentive to the manufacturer to order more raw material in the low season.
Determination of coordination coefficients of mutual incentive mechanism
Under the mutual incentive mechanism, there are four coordination coefficients I h , q 0,h , I l , q 0,l . Typically, the manufacturer will choose I h , the supplier will choose I l and the coefficients q 0,h , q 0,l are usually negotiated between the manufacturer and the supplier. The coefficients should be chosen to achieve the total profit maximization of the chain, and to guarantee a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and the supplier in the chain. First we look at the values of I h and I l . The principle of determining the coordination coefficients I l , I h is to achieve the total profit maximization of the supply chain. Actually, for the centralized model, the total profit of the supply chain is maximized. If we choose the coefficient I l , I h such that the solutions under the mutual incentive mechanism are the same with those under the centralized case, then the total profit has been maximized. By comparing equations (12), (14) and (16), we can see that when I h , I l satisfy the conditions in the following equation
the decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer are completely consistent with those of the centralized supply chain, and the total profit of the supply chain will reach the profit level under the centralized case. That is
Therefore, the manufacturer and the supplier should choose I h , I l such that equation (17) holds. After I h , I l have been chosen to achieve the maximized total profit, the manufacturer and the supplier can negotiate with each other to determine the values of q 0,l , q 0,h . The choice of q 0,l , q 0,h will determine how the total profit is allocated between the supplier and the manufacturer. The principle for determining the coordination coefficients q 0,l , q 0,h is to guarantee a win-win situation for both the supplier and the manufacturer, that is to ensure that the profits of the supplier and the manufacturer under coordination mechanism are no less than those under decentralized case. The values of coordination coefficients q 0,l , q 0,h can actually determine the allocation of spillover profit brought by mutual incentive coordination. As the allocation is settled through negotiation between the supplier and the manufacturer, the coordination coefficients mainly rely on the negotiation skills of both parties. The stronger the supplier is in negotiation, the smaller q 0,h is, and the stronger the manufacturer is in negotiation, the smaller q 0,l is. If the proportion of the spillover profit allocated to the supplier is β, the proportion of the spillover profit allocated to the manufacturer is 1 − β, and among them, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, then coordination coefficients q 0,l , q 0,h can be obtained by the following equations:
(19)
Further discussions
From the decision principle on coefficients of the mutual incentive mechanism and equation (18), we can get the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism, the manufacturer's ordering quantity of the raw material is completely satisfied by the supplier.
From proposition 6 we know that under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism, the manufacturer's ordering quantity will be completely fulfilled by the supplier, so the manufacturer's pressure of paying extra cost (higher price and searching cost) to purchase the raw material outside of the channel is alleviated.
On the other hand, if equation (17) holds, it is easy to check that the condition H m ≤ λP s,l + I l + I h in equation (16) is equivalent to the condition H m ≤ P s,h − C s in equation (12). Further, from equations (18), (17) and (12), we can see that if H m is not too big (H m ≤ P s,h −C s ), then we have q
That is, under the mutual incentive mechanism, in the low season, the ordering quantity for the manufacturer is the supplier's production capacity. Therefore, the supplier can make a bigger profit .
Another interesting phenomenon is that although the total profit of the supply chain is maximized under the mutual incentive mechanism, the shortage probability of the final product in the high season is actually increased.
Proposition 7 Under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism, the shortage probability of the final product supply is increased further in the high season.
Proof. The shortage probability of final product supply is
From equations (11) and (12), we can see that
Due to the price regulation of raw materials in the channel in the high season, we have that P s,h > (1 + λ)P s,l . Therefore, we can get P r(
Q. E. D. In this regard, the contradiction between coal and electricity supply under price regulation would not be solved by the coal-electricity integration strategy proposed by some scholars (Zhao et al, 2012) . On the contrary, the electricity supply shortage probability may be increased in the high season. under decentralized and mutual incentive cases when H m equals 30 CNY/ton (H m ≤ λP s,l ), 100 CNY/ton (λP s,l < H m ≤ P s,h − C s ) and 700 CNY/ton (H m > P s,h − C s ) are shown in Table 2 , respectively. From Table 2 we can see under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism, the ordering quantity of raw material from the manufacturer decreases in the high season, while the ordering quantity of raw material from the manufacturer tends to increase in the low season. Table 2 also shows that the shortage probability of the final product supply is higher than that in the decentralized case in the high season. These numerical results are consistent with Proposition 6 and Proposition 7.
On the other hand, from Table 2 , we can see that under the mutual incentive mechanism, in the low season, the ordering quantity from the manufacturer is equal to the supplier's production capacity, when the holding cost H m is not too big (H m = 30, 100). When the holding cost H m is too big (H m = 700), the manufacturer's ordering quantity is lower than the production capacity, and the supplier will sell some of the raw material outside of the channel in the low season.
The coordination coefficients q 0,l , q 0,h are set by the supplier and the manufacturer through negotiation. The spillover profit under the mutual incentive mechanism are allocated based on the values of q 0,h , and q 0,l . The relations between the proportion of spillover profit allocated to the supplier β and coordination coefficients q 0,l , q 0,h are shown as Fig. 2 .
Through the theoretical results and the above numerical example analysis, it can be seen that under the mutual incentive mechanism, the decisions of the supplier and the manufacturer are consistent with those of the centralized supply chain, and the total profit of the supply chain reaches the profit level under the centralized case. The mutual incentive mechanism has effectively coordinated seasonal products supply chain channel under double price regulation. Moreover, the negotiation skills of the supplier and the manufacturer are also considered, so that the spillover profit under the mutual incentive coordination mechanism can be allocated to reach a win-win situation for both the supplier and the manufacturer.
Conclusions
In this paper, we consider the optimal decision-making problems on production, ordering and sales of a seasonal product supply chain channel under double price regulation with a low season and a high season. We formulate the decentralize model as a Stackelberg game model first. Our Figure 2 : Relation between β and q 0,l , q 0,h research indicates that under double price regulations, the supplier tends not to fulfill the order quantity of the manufacturer during the high season, and the manufacturer needs to pay extra searching cost to buy the raw material from outside of the channel. On the other hand, during the low season, the supplier will face the low level of ordering quantity from the manufacturer, and the supplier needs to pay extra advertisement cost to sell some raw material outside of the channel.
We further investigate the problem by considering a centralized decision model, for which the goal is to maximize the total expected profit of the whole supply chain. In this situation, the supplier will always fulfill the ordering quantity from the manufacturer during the high season, and on the other hand, the manufacturer's ordering quantity will equal to the supplier's production capacity during the low season if the holding cost is not too big.
Finally, we propose a mutual incentive mechanism under which the manufacturer will subside the supplier for excess supply of the raw material in the high season, while in the low season, the supplier will subside the manufacturer to order more raw materials. By carefully choosing the subsiding ratios, we can achieve the maximized profit for the supply chain and the results are consistent with the centralized case. After the total profit of the supply chain is maximized, the manufacturer and the supplier can negotiate with each other to allocate the total spillover profit, so that a win-win situation can be reached. Under the mutual incentive mechanism, the supplier tends to supply more raw material during the high season and the manufacturer tends to order more raw material during the low season.
One very interest result is that under the mutual incentive case, the coordination between the supplier and the manufacturer may lead to a higher supply shortage probability of the final product in the high season. Therefore, the double price regulation may not be a good solution of the high season shortage. This could be the subject of our further research.
